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Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift
David Schkade,* Cass R. Sunstein,** and Daniel Kahneman***

I. Introduction
How, if at all, is the outcome of group deliberation
different from a statistical aggregation of individual
predeliberation judgments? How might jury deliberations depart
from the median or mean of individual judgments? Speculation is
not difficult. Perhaps juries converge toward the midpoint of
individual judgments; perhaps juries move away from, or toward,
the high or low of individual extremes. Perhaps juries produce
an outcome that is more just or more accurate; perhaps juries
generate more predictable and less erratic judgments, so that
unpredictability at the individual level, or at the level of the
mean or median of (six or twelve) individual judgments, is
further reduced by deliberation at the jury level. A pervasive
question is whether a deliberating jury has the effect of
producing outcomes that treat the similarly situated similarly-perhaps in terms of civil or criminal liability (do people who
have engaged in the same conduct receive the same verdict?),
perhaps in the determination of appropriate damage awards,
either compensatory or punitive (do similarly situated people
receive the same awards?).1
In this Essay, we attempt to make some progress on these
questions. We do so principally by reporting the results of an
extensive study of mock juries (over 3000 people and 500 juries
*
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Business, University of Texas, Austin.
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Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, Law
School and Department of Political Science, University of Chicago.
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1
For concerns along this line, see BMW of North America v. Gore, 116 S Ct
1589 (1996); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of
Punitive Damages, 72 Va L Rev 139 (1986).
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in total). Six-person juries were asked to deliberate about the
appropriate punishment in civil cases involving personal injury;
they answered this question in two ways, by setting punitive
awards in dollars and by indicating, on a rating scale, the
severity of the punishment they wished to inflict on the
defendant. Our most important and general finding is that with
respect to dollar awards, deliberation produces a severity
shift: The jury s dollar verdict is typically higher, and often
far higher, than the median judgment of the same jury s
individual members before deliberation began.2
•

2

To compress a long story, our specific findings are
Jurors followed a simple principle of majority rule
deciding whether to impose punitive damages at all;
decision to award damages was largely a function of
majority of individual predeliberation votes.

these:
in
the
the

•

Where predeliberation juror judgments favored a high
punishment rating, deliberation typically increased the
rating of the group, as compared to the median of
individual jurors predeliberation ratings.

•

Where predeliberation juror judgments favored a low
punishment rating, deliberation typically decreased the
rating of the group, as compared to the median of
individual jurors predeliberation ratings.

•

As compared with the median of individual predeliberation
judgments, large dollar awards increased after group
deliberation, often dramatically so: Among juries that
voted to award punitive damages, 27% reached dollar
verdicts that were as high as or higher than the highest
predeliberation judgment among their own jurors.

•

As compared with the median of individual predeliberation
judgments with respect to dollars, most small dollar awards
above zero also increased as a result of deliberation,

Compare the finding of a leniency shift in criminal juries and that this
shift produces more accurate judgments, because juries are more likely than
individual jurors to apply the reasonable doubt standard correctly. See
Robert MacCoun and Norbert Kerr, Asymmetric Influence in Mock Jury
Deliberation: Jurors Bias for Leniency, 54 J Persononality and Social
Psych. 21 (1988).
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though the increase was
awards.
•

smaller than for high dollar

With respect to punishment ratings, jury verdicts were
neither more nor less consistent and predictable than the
mean or median juror. With respect to dollar awards, jury
verdicts were less consistent and predictable than the mean
or median juror. With respect to dollars, jury deliberation
substantially increases unpredictability.

For punishment ratings, the principal effect of
deliberation was thus to move group judgments toward a more
extreme version of the original tendency (low or high) of
individuals within that group. This effect is, we believe,
closely related to phenomena frequently studied under the labels
of risky shifts,
choice shifts, and group polarization. 3
With dollar awards generally--the more important issue--the
effect of deliberation was to produce the severity shift, found
by showing that a jury s dollar verdict is systematically higher
than the median predeliberation judgments of jurors. The
severity shift stems, we believe, from a systematic rhetorical
advantage held by those arguing for higher dollar awards, an
advantage that operates independently of the particular case at
issue.
The study reported here has the advantage of being
extremely close to--in fact part of the design is based on--an
earlier one involving not deliberating juries but responses of
899 individuals to punitive damage cases.4 Our earlier study was
3

See, e.g., David Myers and Helmut Lamm, The Group Polarization Phenomenon,
83 Psych. Bulletin 602 (1976); Daniel Isenberg, Group Polarization: A
Critical Review and Meta-Analysis, 50 J. Personality and Social Psychology
1141 (1986). Russell Spears, Martin Lee, and Stephen Lee, De-Individuation
and Group Polarization in Computer-Mediated Communication, 29 British J Soc
Psych 121 (1990); Craig McGarty et al., Group Polarization As Conformity to
the Prototypical Group Member, 21 British J. Soc. Psych. 1, 3 (1992).. More
particularly, our data show a choice shift. See Johannes Zuber et al. Choice
Shift and Group Polarization, 62 J Personality and Social Psych. 50 (1992)
4
See Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, and David Schkade, Assessing Punitive
Damages, 107 Yale LJ 2071 (1998). This presentation is geared to analysis of
the legal issues; the underlying data, and relevant psychological points, are
presented in more detail in Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, and Cass R.
Sunstein, Shared Outrage and Erratic Awards: The Psychology of Punitive
Damages, 16 Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 49 (1998).
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focussed on the question of predictability, which we understood
to be a function of whether the judgment of one randomly
selected jury is a good predictor of the judgment of other
randomly selected juries judging the same case.5 We found a
remarkable consensus in the judgments of individual jurors, made
on a rating scale, about a series of personal injury cases.
That study therefore found that with respect to the underlying
moral evaluation, groups of different (non-deliberating6) jurors
are likely to reach similar conclusions about the relative
severity of different cases.7 Thus all-white, all-poor, all-rich,
all-educated, all poorly educated, all-male, all-female, allyoung, and all-old juries would probably come to very similar
rankings of a set of cases, at least in personal injury cases
and very possibly elsewhere.8 It follows that the median of the
individual judgments of any random group of twelve people is
likely to produce a moral judgment that predicts, with a
reasonably high degree of accuracy, the judgment of any other
group of twelve people (also defined by the median of the
individual judgments of group members).
At the same time, the study found that assessment of cases
in terms of dollars produces great unpredictability.9 To be
sure, the aggregate dollar awards produced a similar ranking of
cases as does the aggregate punishment rating. But dollar awards
are unpredictable in the specific sense that punishment ratings
are not: the judgment of any particular group of twelve
(determined by taking the median judgment as that of the group)
is a poor predictor of the judgment of other groups of twelve
(determined in the same way).10 We showed that the same case,
5

Thus variance among juries exposed to the same case is our basic measure of
unpredictability. We also explore the question of predictability by seeing
whether identifiable features of cases are good predictors of awards. See
below. We use the term erratic as a synonym for unpredictable.
6
As explained below, synthetic juries consisted of random groups of twelve
individual judgments, with the mean or median judgment of the group of twelve
reflecting the verdict.
See 107 Yale LJ at 2098.
7
Id. at 2095-2100.
8
Id. at 2097-2100.
9
Id. at 2100-2104.
10
Note that in our study we hold constant several factors that can be used to
capture some of the variability in punitive damage awards, such as
compensatory damages, case category, case particulars, and jurisdiction. It
has been proposed by some authors that when analyzed using these factors,
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presented to different jurors, will elicit similar rankings but
quite different dollar awards, producing a situation where the
similarly situated are not treated similarly. This
unpredictability may well produce overdeterrence in risk-averse
defendants or in any case muffled and confusing signals.11 We
concluded that the unbounded dollar scale contributes to
evidently erratic monetary judgments in many areas of the law,
including not only punitive damages but also compensatory awards
in areas involving libel, sexual harassment, pain and
suffering,12 and intentional infliction of emotional distress.13
This earlier study did not involve deliberating juries, and
in the absence of evidence about how deliberation would affect
individual judgments, we analyzed statistical juries, by
treating the median of a deliberating group as a good predictor
of the ultimate judgment of the deliberating jury.14 We did so on
the ground that the received wisdom seemed to support this
approach.15 In this paper, we investigate the received wisdom-and find overwhelming evidence that it is wrong. The dollar
awards of deliberating groups were not close to any measure of
central tendency; they were much higher. More particularly, we
investigate several questions of interest to those interested in
damages, juries, and deliberative processes in general.16 The
answers should have implications not only for punitive awards,
but also for other damage judgments, certainly when these are
hard to monetize, and possibly for questions of civil and
criminal liability as well and even for deliberation generally.
punitive awards are reasonably predictable. See Theodore Eisenberg et al.,
The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. Legal Stud. 623 (1997),
Because we hold these factors constant, the unpredictability that we
documented previously, and that we document here, cannot be accounted for by
any of these factors.
11
See Paul Rubin Et al., BMW v. Gore: Mitigating the Punitive Economics of
Punitive Damages, 1997 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 179, 184.
12
See, e.g., David Lebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering
Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 256 (1989).
13
Sunstein, Kahneman, and Schkade, supra note 4, at 2131-2140.
14
Sunstein, Kahneman, and Schkade, supra note 4, at 2101.
15
See id.
16
On the latter topic, see Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and
Disagreement (1997); our analysis of group polarization raises some questions
for the deliberative conception of democracy, though we leave those questions
largely implicit here.
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As we have noted, the present study finds that as compared
with the median of individual predeliberation judgments,
deliberation significantly increases high dollar awards,
increases high punishment ratings, decreases low punishment
ratings, and modestly increases low dollar awards. To summarize
a complex analysis, it follows that deliberating juries produce
even more unpredictability than was observed for statistical
juries. Moreover, dollar responses vary much more across juries
than does punitive intent on a rating scale. Thus we find shared
moral judgments but erratic dollar awards not only for
individuals but for deliberative juries as well.
What follows at the normative level? Without an independent
theory of what awards should be, the evidence found here does
not show whether deliberation, and the resulting severity shift,
make dollar awards better or worse. The safest and most cautious
conclusion is that to the extent that unpredictable punitive
damage awards raise a serious concern, the problem is not
removed by deliberation. To the extent that unpredictability is
a problem, our findings about the outcomes of jury deliberation-predictable moral judgments but unpredictable dollar awards-raise further questions about whether punitive awards should be
made by juries, or instead by judges or some kind of
administrative institution.17 Perhaps juries should be asked to
come up with punishment ratings, not with dollar awards, and the
legal system should translate jury ratings into dollar awards
by some preset formula. Our findings also raise a set of novel
issues about deliberation as a whole. Is deliberation anything
to celebrate if groups tend to move further in the direction
suggested by their original tendency--if (for example) high
dollar awards go up, low punishment ratings go down, and groups
opposed to gun control and in favor of affirmative action end up
thinking a more extreme version of what individual group members
originally thought? We offer a brief discussion of some of
these issues, with particular reference to the effects of
deliberation on punishment ratings and on dollar awards.

17

See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Stanford Law Review (forthcoming 2000). The
point is generally discussed in Sunstein, Kahneman, and Schkade, supra note
4, at 2126-2130.
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Outrage and Scales

Jury awards of punitive damages have become one of the most
controversial topics in modern public law.18 To take just one
example, an award of $4.9 billion against General Motors
attracted a great deal of national attention in July, 1999.19 It
is now clear that the due process clause imposes constraints on
permissible awards.20 A number of statutes, enacted and proposed,
create punitive damage caps, 21 and high awards have become a
primary impetus for tort reform in general.22 There are also
controversial issues about punitive damage awards in civil
rights cases, most notably sexual harassment.23 At the same time,
the problems created by punitive awards bear on related
questions in other areas of the law, involving, for example,
compensatory damages for pain and suffering, libel, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.24 Similar problems
arise whenever an administrative agency is asked to impose civil
fines and also in the area of criminal sentencing.25
18

See, e.g., Symposium, 1998 Wisconsin L. Rev. 1; A. Mitchell Polinsky and
Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev.
869 (1998); Marc Galanter and David Luban, Poetic Justice, 42 Am U L Rev 1393
(1993); David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Punitive Damages, 40 Ala. L.
Rev. 705 (1989); William Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure
of Tort Law 160-65, 184-85, 223-24 (1987)..
19
See The New York Times, July 31, 1999, Section A; Page 9; Column 3, General
Motors Appeals Record Lawsuit Damages.
20
See BMW v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
21
See generally Developments in the Law---The Civil Jury, 110 Harv L Rev
1408, 1533 n. 158 (1997) (discussing actual and proposed caps). A number of
state supreme courts have invalidated such measures. See, e.g., State ex
rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1090--95
(Ohio 1999) (striking down caps on punitive and general damages as violating
state constitutional provisions of right to jury trial and due process).
22
See, e.g., Product Liability Reform Act of 1997, S. 5, 105th Cong. Section
108 (1997). For general discussion, skeptical of the attention paid to high
awards, see Marc Galanter, Shadow Play: The Fabled Menace of Punitive
Damages, 1998 Wisconsin L Rev 1.
23
See Judy Shih and Cass R., Sunstein, Damages in Sexual Harassment Cases, in
Sexual Harrassment (Catharine MacKinnon and Reva Siegel eds, forthcoming
2000).
24
See, e.g., Randall Bovgher et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort, 83 NW U L
Rev 908 (1989); David Baldus et al., Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury
Damages Assessments, 80 Iowa L Rev 1109 (1995); Leebron, supra note 12.
25
See Edward L. Rubin, Punitive Damages, 1998 Wisc. L. Rev. 131.
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Participants in the legal system are often requested to
come up with some kind of judgment, factual or normative, and
then to translate that judgment into a dollar award. In the
area of punitive damages, it is necessary to make some
assessment of the character of the defendant s behavior, and
then to ascertain the appropriate dollar amount to be paid to
the plaintiff by way of punishment. In many domains,
compensatory judgments raise similar puzzles. While juries are
nominally expected to find a fact ---what amount of money would
restore the plaintiff to the status quo ante?---it is often
extremely difficult to monetize the relevant harm, and normative
judgments undoubtedly play a significant role.26 In the case of
punitive damages, it is extremely difficult for even experts to
agree on what dollar amount constitutes adequate punishment or
produces an appropriate deterrent signal.
In all of these areas, the legal system is pervaded by a
degree of unpredictability and variance, resulting in apparent
arbitrariness, as the similarly situated are treated
differently.27 An extensive study of pain and suffering cases
found that as much as 40% of the awards consists of noise,
unexplained by objective factors.28 A study of all reported
sexual harassment cases was unable to connect either
compensatory or punitive awards to any case characteristics that
might be thought to explain jury judgments.29 The punitive damage
area is more complicated---a point to which we will return
shortly---but there is evidence of significant variability here
as well.30 The most ambitious claims to the contrary attempt to
26

See generally Michelle Anderson and Robert MacCoun, Goal Conflict in Juror
Assessments of Compensatory and Punitive Damages, 23 Law and Human Behavior
313 (1999); Patrick Atiyah, The Damages Lottery (1997).
27
See, e.g., Leebron, supra note 12; Jonathan Karpoff and John Lott, On the
Determinants and Importance of Punitive Damages Awards, 42 J. L. & Econ. 527
(1998).
28
See Leebron, supra note 12.
29
See Judy Shih and Cass R. Sunstein, Damages in Sexual Harassment Cases,
forthcoming in Sexual Harassment (Catharine MacKinnon and Reva Seigel eds.
1999)
30
See Karpoff and Lott, supra note 27. There is some dispute over the degree
of unpredictability. Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of
Punitive Damages, 26 J. Legal Stud. 623 (1997), shows that the log of
punitive awards is predicted reasonably well from a set of objective
characteristics of cases in which awards were made; in particular, it is
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show that once the compensatory award has been made, the
punitive award becomes predictable to a certain degree31; but the
same data show that at the time a case is filed (before the
amount of compensatory damages is known), it is very hard to
know the expected punitive award, and that there is a generally
a great deal of noise in outcomes.32
To understand the current study, it is necessary to
understand its predecessor by the way of background. Our earlier
study involved a demographically diverse set of jury-eligible
citizens from Austin, Texas.33 The relevant experiment involved
28 personal injury cases, which respondents were asked to assess
in one of three ways: outrageousness, on a rating scale (0 to
6); intent to punish, on a rating scale (also 0 to 6); and
actual awards, on the unbounded scale of dollars. As noted, our
principal findings were twofold. People s moral judgments are
widely shared and predictable, in fact strikingly so, at least
in the personal injury cases investigated in this study.34 But in
spite of this point, and in the presence of shared moral
judgments, people s judgments on a dollar scale---the scale, or
response mode, favored by the legal system---are highly
unpredictable in the sense that the median judgment of any group
of twelve people is an extremely poor predictor of the median

shown that the compensatory award is a fairly good predictor of the punitive
award. See id. at 644. But the authors themselves note that the range of
possible awards in regular (i.e., not log) dollars is still quite high even
after controlling for the many factors in their regression model, including
compensatory damages. For example, in their data, for a case with a $500,000
compensatory award, 5% of punitive damage awards would be $10,000 or less,
but another 5% would be $6,500,000 or more. See id. at 657; see also Karpoff
and Lott, supra note 27.
Note also that predictability can be understood in different ways: (a)
predictability exists when case characteristics predict punitive awards; (b)
predictability exists when the judgments of one group of six or twelve
predicts the judgments of another group of six or twelve; (c) predictability
exists when an actor can assess expected liability when something goes wrong.
Our principal emphasis here is on (b); Eisenberg s emphasis is on (a); both
are relevant to (c). Of course the three are closely related in practice. We
offer a more detailed treatment of predictability below.
31
See Eisenberg et al., supra note 10.
32
See Karpoff and Lott, supra note 27.
33
See Sunstein, Kahneman, and Schkade, supra note 4.
34
Id. at 2097-2100.
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judgment of any other group of twelve people.35 Lacking a
reliable understanding of how deliberation would affect
individual judgments, we used the median of groups of twelve
individuals, randomly selected from our pool of 899 citizens and
combined them into a large number of statistical juries. 36 At
least in this setting, the primary identifiable source of the
noise is the difficulty jurors have in translating their
punitive intent into dollars. Dollar awards are highly variable
despite the existence of shared moral judgments.
To explain why the use of the dollar scale would produce
variability, we developed a theory of juror punitive damage
judgments. The outrage model assumes that a juror s basic
response to a defendant s behavior is a reaction of outrage,
which in turn leads to an intent to punish, which can be
expressed on different response scales (for example, a dollar
amount or a rating from 0 to 6). These scales vary not only in
their complexity, but also in the precision and consistency of
the measurements that they provide: Some scales are less
reliable than others, in the sense that they are less consistent
at producing the same answer to the same question, or different
answers to different questions. As we have already seen, the
dollar scale is in this sense an extremely unreliable expression
of punitive intent, and it produces a high degree of
arbitrariness.
To understand the reasons for the noise in dollar damage
judgments, we explored the close analogy between our findings
with respect to the dollar scale and the outcome of
psychological research on the problem of magnitude scaling,
which occurs when people are asked to indicate the intensity of
their subjective responses to stimuli---the brightness of
lights, the loudness of noise---along an unbounded numerical
scale.37 In some of these experiments, the participants are
35
36

See id. at 2100-2103.

We relied on evidence that median judgments are a good predictor. See James
Davis, Group Decision Making and Quantitative Judgments: A Consensus Model,
in Understanding Group Behavior 35, 47 (Erich White and James Davis eds.,
1996); Shari Diamond and Jonathan Casper, Blindfolding the Jury, 26 L &
Society Rev. 513, 553 (1992). We did note, however, the possibility of
effects of the sort observed in the study here. See Sunstein, Kahneman, and
Schkade, supra note 4, at 2101 at n. 128.
37
See S.S. Stevens, Psychophysics (1975).
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given a modulus , which specifies the number that is to be
assigned to a particular standard stimulus. In other
experiments, the participants are not given a modulus. In the
absence of a modulus, variability increases dramatically; some
participants assign high numbers, others assign low number. With
the dollar scale, the underlying problem is that people are
being asked to scale without a modulus, that is, without a
standard that would help give meaning to various numbers on the
scale.38
The key point is that when a modulus is supplied, the
variability greatly decreases; in its absence, respondents adopt
their own moduli. Juries asked to assess punitive damage awards
are in effect asked to scale without a modulus. Unpredictable
judgments are a natural result even when people do not disagree
about the significant issues39---even when, that is, there is a
kind of bedrock moral judgment in place. If this point is
correct, it helps explain the observed variability in dollar
awards in many areas of the law. It also helps explain the
disparities that led to the enactment of the Sentencing
Guidelines40; before the guidelines, judges were being asked, in
effect, to scale without a modulus, since the relevant scale
(years) has a great deal in common with the dollar scale (i.e.,
bounded below at zero, but with great discretion at the high
end).
Our earlier study did not, however, involve deliberating
juries, and a natural question is whether deliberating juries
would produce similar or quite different results. Perhaps
deliberation would reduce variability.41 In any case a test of
38
39

Sunstein, Kahneman, and Schkade, supra note 4, at 2106-2107.

For similar results, see Michael J. Saks et al., Reducing Variability in
Civil Jury Awards, Law & Human Behav., Spring 1997, at 243.
40
See Sandra Shane-DuBow et al., US Department of Justice, Sentencing Reform
in the United States (1985).
41
In a series of papers, Michael Saks has argued that juries actually reduce
variance. Saks research began by comparing twelve person juries to six
person juries, see the overview in Michael Saks, The Smaller the Jury, the
Greater the Unpredictability, 79 Judicature 263 (1996)---a comparison on
which our study here does not bear. But the analysis has been extended to
comparisons of juries and judges, with the suggestion that juries are likely
to produce less variability by virtue of their numbers. See Michael Saks, Do
We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System--and Why Not? 140 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1147 (1992); Justice
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deliberating juries would help to confirm or deny the wisdom of
the decision to treat the median judgment of a group of twelve
as the likely judgment of any deliberating group (for purposes
of creating statistical juries). An alternative possibility,
referred to in the introduction, was to speculate that the
process of collective deliberation would move the group further
in the direction of the initial tendency suggested by the
individual judgments. Hence our main purpose in this study was
to examine the effects of jury deliberation on dollar awards and
in particular to see whether deliberation would increase or
decrease predictability. In the process we also hoped, as a
secondary goal, to find out whether the original findings--shared moral judgments but erratic awards---would be replicated
with a new sample of citizens from a different state, and with
new and richer case materials.
III. Deliberating Juries: An Experimental Inquiry
A. Method
Jury-eligible citizens from Phoenix, Arizona were recruited
by a survey firm and paid $35 for their participation. Each
juror was randomly assigned to a six-person jury, and to a
response mode order; half of juries judged dollar awards first
and punishment ratings second, and the other half completed the
tasks in the opposite order. Each jury judged only one case,
which was the subject of both its punishment rating (on a scale
Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial
of Mass Torts, with Peter D. Blanck, 44 Stanford Law Review 815 (1992);
Reducing Variability in Civil Jury Awards, with Lisa A. Hollinger, Roselle L.
Wissler, David L. Evans, and Allen J. Hart, 21 Law and Human Behavior 243
(1997). This basic conclusion is briefly challenged in a footnote in Robert
MacCoun, Inside the black box: What empirical research tells us about
decisionmaking by civil juries, in Verdict: Assessing the civil jury system
137, 178 n. 26 (Robert E. Litan ed. 1993):
The argument is based on
statistical sampling theory, but the analogy between empaneled juries and
random samples is an imperfect one. Thus, it is a plausible hypothesis, but
requires more rigorous testing than it has received to date. We have
attempted a more rigorous test here, finding that juries produce more
variability as compared with the mean of individual predeliberation
judgments. This finding suggests, though it does not prove, that juries will
produce more variability in awards than judges (a suggestion supported by the
possibility that judicial experience with a wide range of cases will
introduce the equivalent of a modulus by which to discipline dollar
awards).
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of 0 to 8) and its dollar award. Six juries (out of a total of
480) had only five members because an insufficient number of
participants showed up at a given appointment time. A pilot test
of 29 juries was conducted in Phoenix to test the materials and
procedure. Because adjustments were very minor, these juries
were added to the main sample and the combined sample was
analyzed together. Therefore, a total of 3048 citizens
participated in 509 juries.
The procedure consisted of four parts. In Part 1, all
participants in a given session viewed a videotape for the case
they would consider, read the corresponding written materials,
and recorded their personal judgment of the appropriate punitive
damage award or punishment rating (Table 1). In Part 2,
participants were randomly assigned to a jury of six members,
and given thirty minutes to deliberate on and reach a unanimous
verdict on a punitive damage amount or a severity of punishment
rating. In Part 3, a new individual response form was
distributed, which asked participants to record a second
personal judgment for the same case, using the complementary
type of verdict (punishment rating or dollar damages) to the one
they had already used. In Part 4, the jury again deliberated to
reach a unanimous verdict on this second type of judgment for
the same case. Thus, for each individual, and for each jury, we
have both a dollar award and a punishment rating for the case
they considered. We use the terms dollar and punishment
judgments to refer to the dollar awards and punishment ratings
made by individuals. For juries we will refer to these as
dollar and punishment verdicts. For purposes of understanding
real-world behavior, the dollar awards are of course most
important. We inquire into punishment ratings both to understand
the relation between punishment judgments and dollar awards, and
to see the effect of deliberation on both of these.
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Table 1
Response Mode Manipulation
Punishment
How much should the defendant be punished because of their
actions, and to deter the defendant and others from similar
actions in the future? Note that the compensatory damages
that the defendant must pay do not count as part of the
punishment. Please circle the number that best expresses the
jury s judgment of the appropriate level of punishment.

None
0

Mild
1

2

Substantial
3

4

Severe
5

6

Extremely Severe
7

8

$ Damages
What amount of punitive damages (if any) should the
defendant be required to pay as punishment and to deter the
defendant and others from similar actions in the future?
Note that the compensatory damages that the defendant must
pay do not count as part of the punishment. Please write the
amount of punitive damages that the jury agreed on in the
blank below.
$ _____________________

The case materials consisted of fifteen personal injury
scenarios (summarized in Table 2).42 An example is provided in
the Appendix. A videotape was prepared for each case, in which
a professional actor read the text of the case and all
instructions aloud. To maximize comprehension, participants were
required both to view the videotape and to read the written
42

Of these ten were more elaborate versions of the same scenarios used in
Kahneman, Schkade and Sunstein, supra note 4, and five were completely new
scenarios which, like the first 10, were based on real cases (Table 1). The
main substantive elaboration on the original scenarios was the addition of a
paragraph of closing arguments by attorneys for each side.
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version. The size of the defendant firm (annual profits of
$100-200 million) and compensatory damages ($200,000) were the
same for all cases. Thus, the variability we observe cannot be
accounted for by a model that depends on variability in
compensatory damage awards or the defendant s ability to pay.
B. Results
1. Preliminaries. Notwithstanding the half hour time limit
for deliberation, 91% of juries reached a unanimous verdict on a
punishment rating (a total of 461 verdicts) and 82% of juries
reached a unanimous verdict on a dollar award (a total of 416
verdicts). The remainder had not reached a verdict when the time
limit expired; these were treated as hung. All further analyses
were conducted on the 401 juries that reached both a punishment
verdict and a dollar verdict.43 Because there were no
statistically significant differences between the verdicts of
juries that judged dollars first and those who judged punishment
first, we analyzed verdicts made by dollar-first juries and
dollar-second juries together.
2. Overview: How do the verdicts of deliberating juries
compare to those of statistical juries? Our basic topic is the
effect of deliberation on juror judgments, assessed by comparing
the jury s verdict to the median predeliberation judgment of the
individuals who compose that jury. We will refer to the median
predeliberation judgment of the individuals in a jury as the
verdict of the statistical jury. For purposes of understanding
the effects of deliberation, we compare the verdicts of
deliberating juries with those of statistical juries.
The results observed for the 15 cases are shown in Table 3.
(The columns labeled DSM are explained later.) The cases are
arranged in the Table in descending order of the median dollar
verdict of deliberating juries. Note first that the median
verdicts of deliberating and statistical juries produce very
similar rankings of the cases. For dollars there is a Spearman

43

We chose the more conservative path of focusing on juries with complete
responses to ensure that comparisons between punishment and dollar verdicts,
and between individuals and juries, were based on the same set of
respondents. Recreating our Tables and Figures with all available responses
produces the same pattern of results, with some slight differences in exact
numbers.
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Table 2
Summary of Personal Injury Scenarios
Case

Description

Williams v. National
Motors
Smith v. Public
Entertainment
Douglas v. Coastal
Industries
Sanders v. A&G Cosmetics

Motorcycle driver injured when brakes
fail
Circus patron shot in arm by drunk
security guard
Auto airbag opens unexpectedly,
injuring driver
Man suffers skin damage from using
baldness cure
Elderly woman suffers back injuries
from using exercise video
Child ingests large quantity of
allergy medicine, needs hospital stay
Employee suffers anemia due to
benzene exposure on the job
Small child playing with matches
burned when pajamas catch fire
Disabled man injured when wheelchair
lift malfunctions
Secretary chronically ill due to
radiation from computer monitor
Seaman injured when molten sulphur
container fails
Train hits car at crossing, injuring
driver
Shopper injured in fall when
escalator suddenly stops
Store employee raped in mall parking
lot
Man nearly drowns when defective boat
sinks

Stanley v. Gersten
Productions
Glover v. General
Assistance
Lawson v. TGI
International
Newton v. Novel Clothing
West v. MedTech
Windsor v. Int.
Computers
Reynolds v. Marine
Sulphur
Crandall v. C&S Railroad
Dulworth v. Global
Elevator
Hughes v. Jardel
Nelson v. Trojan Yachts
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Table 3. Median Verdicts for Deliberating and Statistical Juries
Punishment Verdicts
Case

Dollar Verdicts

Statistica
l Juries

Deliberatin
g Juries

Average
DSM

Statistical
Juries

Deliberating
Juries

Average
DSM

Reynolds

5.5

6.0

15%

1,875,000

10,000,000

54%

Glover

5.0

5.0

1

1,000,000

4,000,000

52

Lawson

4.3

4.5

4

475,000

2,000,000

53

Williams

5.0

5.0

14

550,000

1,500,000

46

Smith

5.5

6.0

19

325,000

1,000,000

52

Nelson

5.0

5.0

20

450,000

1,000,000

48

Hughes

5.0

5.0

12

450,000

1,000,000

45

West

4.5

5.0

9

500,000

1,000,000

34

Douglas

4.0

4.0

11

225,000

500,000

40

Crandall

4.0

4.0

-8

200,000

500,000

35

Sanders

3.5

3.0

-8

50,500

100,000

25

Windsor

3.0

2.0

-26

37,500

50,000

38

Stanley

1.0

1.5

0

0

0

0

Dulworth

0.3

0.0

-15

0

0

17

Newton

0.0

0.0

3

0

0

23

Mean of
Top 5

5.1

5.3

11

845,000

3,700,000

51

Mean of
Middle 5

4.5

4.6

9

365,000

800,000

40

Mean of
Bottom 5

1.6

1.3

-9

17,600

30,000

21

Overall
Mean

3.7

3.7

3

409,200

1,510,000

37
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rank correlation44 of .88 between the deliberating and
statistical jury verdicts in Table 3; for punishment verdicts
the average rank correlation is even higher, at .98.
Furthermore, the correlation between punishment verdicts and
dollar verdicts is also high at .87. These results confirm the
finding of earlier research that judgments of punitive intent
and of dollar awards share the same core of moral outrage, and
therefore produce the same ordering of cases, at least in the
aggregate.
While there is agreement on the ordering of cases, the
level of verdicts tells a different tale. Punishment verdicts
are, on average, quite close for statistical and deliberating
juries, but dollar verdicts show a dramatic difference:
deliberating juries produce much higher awards, especially at
but not only at the high end. Indeed, 83% of the 330 non-zero
dollar verdicts are above the median individual for that jury.
This is the most important finding in the study: the severity
shift in dollar verdicts.
In summary, then, aggregate verdicts from deliberating and
statistical juries show strong agreement on the relative
egregiousness of the cases, and for punishment verdicts, they do
not dramatically diverge. Deliberating juries, however, produce
dollar verdicts that far exceed the median of the jurors that
compose them. We now try to understand how this pattern might
occur. To do so, we divide decisions into three parts: (1) the
decision about whether to punish at all; (2) the decision about
the appropriate punishment verdict; and (3) the decision about
the appropriate dollar verdict. As we shall see, the effects of
deliberation are quite different for the three decisions.
3. Punish or Not Punish: A Majority Model. The first decision
for a jury is, presumably, to determine whether to punish, or to
reject punishment by a verdict of $0 in damages or a 0
punishment rating. Table 4 shows the percentage of non-zero
verdicts that were made by juries, depending on the initial
distribution of judgments among the jurors. The pattern is
identical for punishment and dollar verdicts: when a majority
44
The Spearman rank correlation is an index of agreement between rankings
that is analogous to first converting each column to ranks (from 1 to 15 in
this case) and then computing the correlation between the two sets of ranks.
It is interpreted similarly to conventional correlations.
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of juror judgments are 0 (i.e., 4 or more), the jury verdict is
virtually certain to itself be 0. When a majority of jurors
have non-zero judgments, the jury verdict is virtually certain
not to be 0. Finally, if the jury is evenly split, the chance
of a 0 verdict is about 50-50.
Without detailed analysis of the deliberation transcripts,
we do not know whether juries actually voted or explicitly
agreed to adopt a majority decision rule. We observe only that
the pattern of results is very consistent with the adoption of
such a rule. In contrast to other phases of the jury decision
that we consider later, there is no evidence of any systematic
effect of deliberation on outcomes (i.e., juries were no more or
less likely to punish that their jurors). Thus, for the
decision of whether or not to impose punitive damages, there is
no indication of any asymmetry of power or influence between
jurors who were initially inclined to say yes and those who were
inclined to say no.

Table 4. Percentage of Non-Zero Verdicts as a Function of
Predeliberation Judgments
Jury Verdicts
Individual
Predeliberation
Judgments

Non-Zero Punishment
Ratings

Non-Zero$ Awards

Majority non-zero

99%

98%

Even split

48%

45%

Majority zero

8%

4%

4. Deliberation Shift Analysis. We now turn to the
severity of punishment verdicts chosen by the juries that
determined that some punishment was appropriate. We wish to
examine the relationship between the post-deliberation verdict
of a jury and the predeliberation distribution of judgments
among its members. For this purpose we introduce a deliberation
shift analysis, which we will apply to both punishment ratings
and dollar awards. The predeliberation judgments of jurors are
first ranked, from the most lenient to the most severe; the
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eventual verdict of the jury is then inserted in that ordering,
and its rank is computed. For example, suppose that the
individual jurors had predeliberation judgments of $0, $200,000,
$300,000, $500,000, $1,000,000, and $5,000,000, and that the
jury verdict was $750,000. The jury verdict ranks 5th in the
distribution of individual judgments of its members. In this
instance, the jury was more severe than 4 of its original
members, and less severe than 2 of its members, indicating that
overall deliberation made judgments more severe.
If the outcomes of deliberation were determined by a simple
voting model, the jury verdict would always be in the middle of
the distribution of initial judgments, at the median. There
would be no shift, toward greater leniency or more punishment.
With no shift, for a jury of 6 (with the jury verdict added as
the 7th member), the predicted position of the jury in the
distribution of the opinions of its members is always 4th.45 The
deliberation shift measure (DSM) is the difference between the
observed and the predicted rank of the jury verdict, as a
percentage of the maximum possible shift in that direction. To
continue our dollar example above, since the jury ranks 5th
among its jurors, the difference would be 5--4 = 1. For a jury
of six, the maximum possible upward shift is 7--4 = 3, and the
DSM would be (1/3) x 100 = 33%. This means that the rank of the
jury verdict was 33% of the way from the rank of the median
juror (4) to the rank of the maximum juror (7).46 DSM is
positive if the jury is more severe than its median member, it
is negative if the jury is more lenient than its median member.
If the jury verdict was higher than the maximum juror, DSM would
be 100%; if it was lower than the minimum juror, DSM would be -100%. To study the systematic effects of deliberation we
computed DSM for every non-hung jury, separately for punishment
verdicts and for dollar verdicts. Table 3 shows the mean values
of DSM for each of the 15 cases, for both punishment and dollar
verdicts.
5. Punishment ratings either up or down. For punishment
verdicts there is a clear pattern in the results, which can be
observed both in the column of DSM values and by comparing the
45

For a jury of 12, the expected rank would be 7, for a jury of 9 the
expected rank would be 5.5, and so forth.
46
Because the DSM is formulated as a percentage, it can be computed for, and
has the same interpretation for a jury of any size.
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statistical and deliberated verdicts: Deliberation increased
the severity of punishment for high-punishment cases, and
reduced it for low-punishment cases. Reading down the table,
DSM is positive for 9 of the top 10 cases, and negative for 4 of
the bottom 5 cases. There was a severity shift for the highpunishment cases, and a leniency shift for the low-punishment
cases.
Because the table is arranged roughly in decreasing order
of punitive intent, we can see that DSM is positive for highpunishment cases (average for the top 10 cases is 10%) and
negative (-9%) for low-punishment cases. Further, the
correlation between DSM and the median statistical jury verdicts
is .67, which means that the more severe the individual
predeliberation judgments, the greater the shift. In the
language of the group polarization literature, we observe
systematic choice shifts, in which deliberation generally
increases differences among cases, by making severe verdicts
more severe and lenient verdicts more lenient, relative to the
predeliberation judgments of jurors.
6. Dollar Awards and the Severity Shift: Deliberation
increases punitive damages. We now turn to the task of
understanding the remarkable difference between the dollar
awards obtained from deliberating juries and from a statistical
pooling of the predeliberation opinions of jury members. The
basic result is that deliberation causes awards to increase, and
it causes high awards to increase a great deal. As extreme but
actual illustrations of the severity shift, consider a few
examples from the raw data:
-- A jury whose predeliberation judgments were $200,000,
$300,000, $2 million, $10 million, $10 million, and $10
million reach a verdict of $15 million
-- A jury whose predeliberation judgments were $200,000,
$500,000, $2 million, $5 million, and $10 million reach a
verdict of $50 million
-- A jury whose predeliberation judgments were $2 million, $2
million, $2.5 million, $50 million, and $100 million reach a
verdict of $100 million
Now consider the DSM column for dollar verdicts in Table 3.
Recall that the value of DSM is positive if the jury verdict is
more severe than the median judgment of its jurors, and negative
if the jury is more lenient. The pattern of results is very
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clear: DSM is generally positive, indicating that deliberation
generally produced a severity shift. Furthermore, DSM for
dollar verdicts is much higher for high-punishment cases than
for low-punishment cases: the correlation between the median
punishment verdict and DSM for dollar verdicts is .95.
The difference between deliberating and statistical juries
is very large, especially for the high-punishment cases: For
the top ten cases in Table 3 the average DSM of 46% means that
the jury verdict is about half-way between the second-highest
and third-highest individual judgments. Even more surprising,
for the ten high-punishment cases, 10% of jury verdicts were
even higher than the highest individual judgment (i.e., the DSM
was 100% for these juries). A further 17% of verdicts were
equal to the highest individual judgment (i.e., a DSM of 83%).
These extreme verdicts were less common for the five lowpunishment cases: 15% of verdicts equaled the highest
individual judgment, and none exceeded this maximum. The
pattern is clear: deliberation made dollar verdicts more
severe, especially for high-punishment cases.
Notably, we did not find that the degree of dispersion
between individual predeliberation judgments contributed to
greater or lesser shifts as a result of deliberation. For
example, for juries with non-zero verdicts for the same case,
the average correlation between the standard deviation of
individual judgments (a measure of dispersion) and the DSM was .05 for dollars and .08 for punishment (neither correlation is
statistically different from 0). In other words, juries whose
members were in rough agreement (i.e., had a low standard
deviation), about dollars or punishment, did not show a
different shift from groups whose members were in substantial
disagreement, about dollars or punishment.
7. Do people from Arizona agree with people from Texas?
The effects of geography, race, gender, education, age, and
wealth. A subsidiary but nonetheless important question is
whether the findings of the earlier study are replicated under
the current study s changes in stimuli, procedure, and sample.
The answer is that the previous results are replicated in every
essential respect. The findings in the Texas study were
replicated in Arizona, despite evident differences between the
two regions, and people from the two areas evaluated cases in
the same way. As before, dollars and ratings produce very
similar rankings of the cases (a rank correlation of .90
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compared to .91 in the previous study47). Different demographic
groups again produced very similar average evaluations, as
indicated by the extremely high correlations in Table 5.
Table 5
Correlation Between Demographic Groups
on Intended Severity of Punishment*
Men
Gender

Women

.99
White

Ethnicity

Hispanic

.92

Other

.88
< 30K

Household
Income

30-50K

.98

> 50K

.99
< 30

Age

Hispanic

.81
30-50K

.99
30-39

30-39

.97

40-49

.96

.97

> 50

.96

.97

40-49

.97

* Entries are correlations between mean responses to scenarios by respondents
in the indicated demographic categories.

In addition, the ordering of case evaluations closely matches
that in our previous study. There are ten cases that are common
to both studies, and evaluations made by Texans in the previous
study are highly predictive of those made by Arizonans in the
current study--the rank correlation between the two samples is
.90 for punishment ratings and .98 for dollar awards. Thus, the
current larger study, with several nontrivial changes, confirms
47

[CITE SKS]

Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics

24

the conclusion of our previous study that individual moral
judgments are predictable and shared, but that expressing them
in dollars produces unpredictability and confusion, and
especially so in juries.
8. With respect to dollars, how predictable are jury
verdicts? An important goal of the legal system is to treat the
similarly situated similarly. Our previous study showed that
both the dollar judgments of individuals and the dollar verdicts
of statistical juries would probably fail this test of
procedural justice, because of a high degree of unpredictability
in damage awards for the same case, as well as inconsistency in
distinguishing between cases of more and less egregious
conduct.48 Among many in the legal community there is the hope,
and indeed the conviction, that deliberation by a group of
jurors will overcome individual biases and produce more just and
more predictable verdicts. As will be seen, our findings lend
no support to this plausible view.
The simplest and most practical criterion for predictability
is reflected in the distribution of possible verdicts for a
given case (a criterion that asks the extent to which the
identically situated are treated identically). This is of course
a critical piece of information for a lawyer advising a client
about whether or not to settle a dispute, or for an actor
contemplating liability for a potentially tortious course of
conduct. In our sample, we have multiple independent juries
rendering punitive damage verdicts for the same case, and this
information can be used to estimate verdict distributions.
Table 6 presents selected distributional statistics for each
case. The range of possible dollar verdicts is strikingly
large. For example, each of the top 5 cases has a minimum award
of $500,000 or less, and yet the average maximum award for these
cases is over $83,000,000. Further, the maximum verdicts are 10
to 500 times as large as the median verdicts (for cases with
non-zero medians). Even for the three cases at the bottom with
zero medians (i.e., a majority of juries for that case awarded
no punitive damages), plaintiffs could still be awarded
$500,000. Also, although there is considerable noise (in part
because the number of juries for each case is relatively small),
48

See Sunstein, Kahneman, and Schkade, supra note 4, at XX.
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the range of verdicts for a given case tends to increase in
proportion to the median verdict.49 Note that these variations
between juries occurred on identical presentations of identical
facts, unaffected by differences in (for example) compensatory
awards or lawyers presentations.
To make the uncertainty of these dollar verdicts more
concrete, imagine that a statistically sophisticated and greatly
experienced lawyer is advising a defendant about a possible
punitive damages award, on the basis of the data illustrated by
Table 5. For the purpose of the illustration, assume that the
lawyer is known to be not only sophisticated but also wise, and
able to make unbiased predictions of jury decisions: when she
states that her best guess is an award of $X, the actual award
is equally likely to be above or below X (this is her estimate
of the median award). On the basis of our data the lawyer would
be able to provide the client with the following information:
My best guess is that you will face a judgment of $X. There
are equal chances that it will be higher or lower than this
amount. However, there is a lot of uncertainty about how
much higher or lower it will be: there is a 10% chance that
you will have to pay more than a times that amount--and there
is a 10% chance that you will have to pay less than 1/b of
that amount.
Averaging across cases, the best estimates50 of a and b,
respectively, are 7.74 and 6.61. On the basis of these values,
a lawyer who predicts a verdict of $2 million should also
estimate that there is a 10% chance that the actual verdict will
be over $15.48 million, and a 10% chance that it will be less
than $.30 million. Because the range increases proportionately
with the mean (except for noise) the same values of a and b
apply for any value of $X.51 Finally, these estimates assume a
49

Kahneman, Schkade and Sunstein (1998) observed a similar pattern.
These estimates are obtained in two steps: (1) compute the following
ratios for each case--90th percentile/median and median/10th percentile. (2)
Compute the geometric mean across cases for each ratio. The geometric mean
is the standard method for averaging ratios. The estimates reported here are
for the 9 cases that have neither a median of zero or a 10th percentile of 0
(see Table 5).
51
To test for proportionality, we run a regression of the difference between
the 90th and 10th percentiles for a given case on the median for that case.
50
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Table 6. Percentiles of Jury Dollar Verdicts, by Case (in
thousands of dollars)
Minimum

Median

Maximum

Case

0th

10th

25th

50th

75th

90th

100th

Reynolds

250

1,000

3,500

10,000

17,500

50,000

100,000

Glover

500

1,000

1,250

4,000

10,000

50,000

100,000

Lawson

200

250

1,000

2,000

6,000

15,000

100,000

Williams

100

200

700

1,500

5,000

10,000

15,500

Smith

0

100

300

1,000

7,000

20,000

100,000

Nelson

100

250

500

1,000

5,000

5,000

100,000

Hughes

0

200

850

1,000

2,000

20,000

40,000

West

1

200

500

1,000

2,000

4,000

10,000

Crandall

0

50

250

500

1,450

2,000

100,000

Douglas

0

1

250

500

1,000

25,000

50,000

Sanders

0

0

0

100

500

1,000

50,000

Windsor

0

0

0

50

400

5,000

25,000

Newton

0

0

0

0

75

200

500

Dulworth

0

0

0

0

40

300

500

Stanley

0

0

0

0

25

250

500

Mean of
Top 5

210

510

1,350

3,700

9,100

29,000

83,100

Mean of
Middle 5

20

140

470

800

2,290

11,200

60,000

Mean of
Bottom 5

0

0

0

30

208

1,350

15,300

Overall
Mean

77

217

607

1,510

3,866

13,850

52,800

If the range goes up proportionately with the median, then this regression
should have a good fit, and the constant in the regression should be close to
zero. In fact, the line fits quite well (R2 = .66) and the constant is not
significantly different from zero (p > .05).

27

Deliberating about Dollars

jury of six. The uncertainty would very likely be reduced
somewhat with a larger jury.52
9. Are Deliberating Juries More Predictable Than Statistical
Juries? In the introduction we asked whether deliberating
juries would produce dollar verdicts that are more predictable
than those of statistical juries. We can now use the a and b
analysis above to answer this question. As with the verdicts of
deliberating juries, variability in the verdicts of statistical
juries is roughly proportional to the median verdict.53 We can
apply the same procedure as before to estimate the factors a and
b, which measure the estimated relationship of the 10th and 90th
percentiles for each case to the median award for that case.
For statistical juries our estimates of a and b are 2.88 and
4.11, which are both far less than the corresponding figures of
6.61 and 7.74 for deliberating juries. In our example above,
the lawyer s predicted range for a statistical jury verdict
would be from $.69 to $8.22 million compared to the range for a
deliberating jury verdict of $.30 to $15.48 million. Obviously,
there is far less uncertainty about the verdicts of statistical
juries than about those of deliberating juries.
This pattern is remarkably consistent across cases. There is
greater uncertainty in deliberating jury verdicts for each of
the 10 cases for which a can be calculated (those with non-zero
medians), and greater uncertainty for 11 of the 12 cases for
which b can be calculated (those with non-zero 10th
percentiles). It is important to note that this estimation
52

Because statistical uncertainty is proportional to the size of the jury, we
can approximate how much smaller a and b would be for a jury of 12, under the
assumption that uncertainty in deliberating juries would reduce at the same
rate as in a statistical jury. In this case, since the jury would be twice
as large, we divide a and b by the square root of 2. The resulting estimates
are a = 4.67 and b = 5.47, which in the lawyer advice example would produce a
predicted verdict range of $.43 million to $10.94 million.
53
To test for proportionality, we again ran a regression of the difference
between the 90th and 10th percentiles of statistical jury verdicts for a
given case on the median for that case. If the range goes up proportionately
with the median, then this regression should have a good fit, and the
constant in the regression should be close to zero. In fact, the line again
fits fairly well (R2 = .56). More importantly, the constant is not
significantly different from zero (p > .05).
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procedure effectively controls for the severity shift, and
therefore that these differences are not due merely to the
generally higher level of verdicts by deliberating juries. We
conclude, rather to our surprise, that deliberation is a
significantly poorer way of aggregating opinions that is
statistical pooling--at least if the goal is to decrease the
arbitrary unpredictability of awards.
IV. What Happened?
And Related Phenomena

Severity Shifts, Rhetorical Asymmetry,

We now turn to a discussion of these results. We emphasize
three phenomena. The first is identified for the first time
here, while the second and third have been studied in many
previous experiments.
•

The first and most important phenomenon is the severity shift.
We believe that this occurred because of a rhetorical
asymmetry, giving one set of arguments an automatic, otherthings-equal upper-hand in a group discussion, so that groups
will typically shift in the direction holding that upper-hand.

•

The second phenomenon, described standardly though somewhat
vaguely as a choice shift, 54 arises when the decision of a
group shifts toward a more extreme version of the view held,
before deliberation, by the group s median member. Our
evidence clearly shows choice shifts with respect to
punishment verdicts, and because high awards increased much
more than low awards, we think that something similar played a
role in the dollar verdicts as well.

•

The third phenomenon, described as group polarization (a
term sometimes used to cover choice shifts as well55), occurs
when individuals, polled privately after group discussion,
shift toward a more extreme point in the direction set by the
original distribution of views.56 Because our jurors were not

54

See Joahnnes Zuber et al., Choice Shift and Group Polarization: An
Analysis of the Status of Arguments and Social Decision Schemes, 62 J Person.
and Soc. Psych. 50 (1992).
55
See id.
56
See note supra. It is possible to have one kind of movement without the
other, though ordinarily the two accompany one another. .See Zuber et al.,
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polled privately after discussion, we do not have direct
evidence of group polarization, though there is reason to
believe that it may have occurred.57
A. The Severity Shift and Rhetorical Asymmetry

Rhetorical Asymmetry. By far the most striking finding
1.
in our data is the severity shift produced by deliberation. What
mechanism causes a jury to decide on an award that exceeds the
initial judgment of their median member--and sometimes to exceed
the highest predeliberation judgment of all its members?
We hypothesize that a feature of deliberation, a rhetorical
asymmetry, helps produce the one-way movement that we observe.
Specifically, once the jury has agreed that there will be a nonzero dollar award, the arguments for a larger award have a
rhetorical advantage, and are more persuasive. If this is the
case, then a jury would be drawn disproportionately toward the
larger predeliberation judgments of its jurors. No such
asymmetry would be expected for the punishment scale, if it is
hypothesized that social norms give the advantage, not to anyone
arguing that the conduct of a corporate defendant was worse in
the abstract, but to anyone arguing for a higher dollar award
against a corporate defendant. The key point has to do with the
translation of a punishment judgment into a dollar award; those
who argue that more money is necessary to punish a corporation
appear to have an upper hand. The unbounded dollar scale affords
great latitude in the expression of what more means.
To examine the hypothesis of rhetorical asymmetry more
directly, we asked 87 University of Chicago law students whether
it would be harder to argue for a smaller or a larger award. If
a general rhetorical asymmetry exists, then it can in principle
be assessed independent of any particular case. In this study,
respondents were simply told that they were deliberating about
punitive damage awards, and were given no details of any case.
They were first asked to generate arguments for a higher or
lower award, and then asked which award (higher or lower) would
be easier to justify. Half of the students were asked to argue
supra note 3, at 59 ( it is necessary to differentiate between choice shift
and group polarization˚.˚.˚. the ongoing processes at these two levels may
differ ).
57
See Roger Brown, Social Psychology XX (2d ed. 1986).
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for a higher award; half were asked to argue for a lower one.
After generating the relevant arguments, they were asked to
complete a second task, which went as follows:
Imagine that a jury in a civil trial is deliberating about
a personal injury case in which the defendant is a large
corporation (with annual profits of approximately $200
million). The jury has already (a) unanimously ordered the
defendant to pay an amount of compensatory damages that fully
compensates the plaintiff, and (b) unanimously concluded that
while the underlying conduct was not truly horrendous, it was
sufficiently reckless to justify an award of punitive damages
as well (in addition to compensatory damages).
In general, which position would you expect to be
harder for a juror to argue for in a deliberation? (please
circle the letter of your answer)
[15%] a) it is harder to argue that damages should be
higher
[55%] b) it is harder to argue that damages should be
lower
[30%] c) the positions are equally hard to argue for
The students were expressly told not to begin the second task
(assessing the comparative difficulty question) until after they
had completed the first (making arguments one way or the
other).58
The results confirmed our hypothesis: a clear majority (55%)
thought that arguing for a lower award would be the more
difficult rhetorical position. Further, of those who showed a
preference, the margin was almost 4 to 1 that arguing for a
larger award is easier. Moreover, there was no effect of being
asked to justify a higher or lower award; both groups agreed
that it is harder to argue for a lower award. Note that the
University of Chicago study closely followed the jury study, in
the sense that the former, like the latter, involved a corporate
defendant with $200 million in annual profits. It seems likely
that a rhetorical asymmetry played a substantial role in

58

See appendix for this study.
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producing jury verdicts consistently above the median
individual, and sometimes even above the highest individual.
2.
Some remaining questions. This finding of rhetorical
asymmetry raises many issues. The concept could be understood in
many ways, both broad and narrow. Taken very broadly, rhetorical
asymmetry is ubiquitous: In any social arrangement containing
norms, those who argue in the direction that is normative for
the group will have the advantage. Those who argue that slavery
was wonderful, or that the Holocaust never happened, or that
animals should be made to suffer, if these positions are
normative in that group, are at rhetorical advantage compared to
those who claim the opposite. It would also be interesting to
know whether a similar rhetorical asymmetry might be at work in
other deliberative contexts. We might imagine, for example,
settings in which those arguing for higher criminal punishments
would have a rhetorical advantage; it is also possible to
imagine places in which people arguing for lower taxes will have
an easier time in any debate.
Narrow understandings of rhetorical asymmetry are possible
and more useful for many purposes. Our claim here is quite
narrow: that when people are asking how much questions in
deliberating about punitive damage awards in dollars, one side
has a systematic advantage, even if the underlying moral
judgments are identical (as measured on the bounded punishment
scale). Would the same effect be found in deliberations about
compensatory awards for libel, sexual harassment, and pain and
suffering? Would the same effect be found for punitive damage
awards if the defendant were not a corporation? If the
plaintiff were a corporation? We turn to some normative issues
below; for the moment we note simply that there is much room for
further study here.
3. An alternative possibility: the mean juror hypothesis.
Another explanation for the severity shift would suggest that
groups move toward the mean of individual dollar judgments,
rather than the median. Because individual dollar judgments are
skewed to the right, and include many extreme judgments, the
mean will be above the median (this is true for 91% of juries),
and could account, in theory, for the higher level of verdicts.
From an analysis of our data, our basic conclusion is that while
it is possible that movements toward the mean may have played
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some role in producing severity shifts, it cannot be the
fundamental explanation. The simplest demonstration of this
comes from the fact that 27% of non-zero jury dollar verdicts
were as high as or higher than that of the highest
predeliberation dollar judgment of individuals. A fuller
explanation requires a more detailed analysis.
To examine the hypothesis that the mean of individual
awards would predict jury dollar verdicts and hence the severity
shift, we recomputed the statistical jury results using the mean
individual judgment, rather than the median.59 As expected, the
mean juror produces higher dollar verdicts than the median
juror, although it is still lower than 64% of non-zero jury
verdicts (albeit an improvement over the 83% figure for the
median juror). This partial success, however, comes at a high
price. Even though the mean juror is consistently higher than
the median juror (and seemingly closer to jury verdicts), it is
less reliable, and is actually is a worse predictor of jury
verdicts on the conventional measures of predictive success: it
explains less of the variance in jury verdicts (4% vs 26%), and
has larger prediction errors on average (compared to the median
juror predictions, the root-mean-square-error60 for the mean
juror is 2.21 times larger, and the mean absolute error is 1.53
times larger). The choice between the median and the mean
mainly means choosing between types of errors--with the median
juror, the statistical jury s verdict is almost always too low,
but almost never disastrously wrong. With the mean juror the
signs of the errors are more balanced (2/3 too low and 1/3 too
high), but there can occasionally be huge positive errors (i.e.,

59

For punishment verdicts (not depicted here for clarity) switching to the
mean as the basis for statistical juries has little effect, because of the
low level of skewness in the distribution of punishment judgments.
60
The root-mean-square error (RMSE) is calculated by first computing the
differences between the predicted verdict (i.e., the median or average of
predeliberation jurors) and the actual verdict (the jury verdict), taking the
square of each difference, and then taking the square root of the average
squared difference. In regression, the predicted value of the regression
equation plays the same role as the mean or median do here, and the RMSE is
thus analogous to the standard error of a regression (the estimate of _).
The mean absolute error (MAE) is computed by taking the average of the
absolute values (i.e., the magnitude, regardless of its sign) of the
differences.

33

Deliberating about Dollars

mean juror far above the jury verdict).61 Thus, even if the mean
juror with its higher overall levels did fit jury verdicts
better (and it does not), we would still need to account for a
consistent upward movement in jury verdicts, relative to the
mean juror, and for those verdicts that are at or above the
maximum individual judgment in that jury.
B. Choice Shifts and Group Polarization
1. The data and the central idea. Our study shows what is
conventionally called a choice shift with respect to
punishment ratings, pivoting around the rating of 3. Choice
shifts of this general sort are common consequences of
deliberation,62 and they have been found in many diverse tasks.
The result is that groups often go in more extreme directions--both higher or lower on the relevant scale---than would the
typical or average individual in the group.
Consider some examples from relevant experiments. (a) A
group of moderately profeminist women will be more strongly
profeminist after discussion.63 (b) Citizens of France become
more critical of the United States and its intentions with
respect to economic aid after discussion.64 (c) After discussion,
whites predisposed to show racial prejudice offer more negative
responses to the question whether white racism is responsible
for conditions faced by African-Americans in American cities.65
(d) After discussion, whites predisposed not to show racial
prejudice offer more positive responses to the same question.66
61

This is usually due to the presence of one or two extremely high
individual judgments in a jury.
62
Some studies suggest that the median predeliberation judgment is a good
predictor of outcomes; but in some situations groups have indeed been
observed to make quite different decisions from those of the median or
average of individuals that compose them. See Norbert Kerr, Robert MacCoun,
and Geoffrey Kramer, Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103
Psychological Review 687 (1996); Daniel Gigone and Reid Hastie, Proper
Analysis Of The Accuracy Of Group Judgments. 121 Psychological Bulletin, 149
(1997).
63
See D.G. Myers, Discussion-Induced Attitude Polarization, 28 Human
Relations 699 (1975).
64
Brown, supra note 57, at 224.
65
D.G. Myers and G.D. Bishop, The Enhancement of Dominant Attitudes in Group
Discussion, 20 J Personality and Soc. Psych. 286 (1976),
66
See id.
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For punishment ratings, the pattern described above is exactly
what would be predicted from the literature on choice shifts.67
2. Risky shifts. Before 1961, conventional wisdom had been
that as compared with the individuals who compose it, a group of
decision-makers--for example, a committee or board--would be
likely to favor a compromise and thus to avoid risks.68 But the
relevant experiments, originally conducted by Stoner, found
otherwise; they identified what has become known as the risky
shift. 69 Deliberation tended to shift individual members in the
direction of greater risk-taking (group polarization); and
deliberating groups, asked to reach a unanimous decision, were
generally more risk-inclined--sometimes far more risk-inclined-than the mean individual member, predeliberation (choice shift).
In Stoner s original data, subsequent researchers noticed,
the largest risky shifts could be found when group members had
a quite extreme risky initial position, in the sense that the
predeliberation votes were weighted toward the risky end,
whereas the items that shifted a little or not at all started
out near the middle of the scale. 70 A group of very cautious
individuals would produce a significant shift toward greater
caution; a group of individuals inclined toward risk-taking
would produce a significant shift toward greater risk-taking;
and groups of individuals in the middle would produce smaller
shifts in the direction indicated by their original disposition.
In short, group discussion moves decisions to more extreme
points in the direction of the original inclination . . . ,
which means shift to either risk or caution in the direction of
67

There is one difference: In the usual choice shift and group polarization
studies, the phenomenon is usually defined by reference to scales having two
sides, with a neutral midpoint, usually defined as O (signalling neutrality
on a question or no opinion). This is the arrangement by which it makes sense
to speak of initial dispositions and their aggravation. Our punishment
ratings, by contrast, lacked an obvious neutral midpoint, and of course
dollar awards have no such midpoint.
68
We draw in this and the following paragraph on Brown, supra note 57, at
200-206.
69
See J.A.F. Stoner, A Comparison of Individual and Group Decisions
Including Risk, unpublished master s thesis, School of Management,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology; J.A.F. Stoner, Risky and Cautious
Shifts in Group Decisions, 4 J Experimental Social Psych. 442 (1968).
70
Brown, supra note 57, at 211.
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the original disposition, and the size of the shift increases
with the degree of the initial polarization. 71 Similar results
have been found in many contexts,72 involving, for example,
questions about economic aid, architecture, political leaders,
race, feminism, and judgments of guilt or innocence.
We do not know if our jurors were susceptible to a group
polarization, because members were not polled individually
afterwards. But there is reason to suspect that this happened as
well.73
3. Two mechanisms, and severity shifts again. There have
been two main explanations for group polarization and choice
shifts, both of which have been extensively investigated.74
Massive support has been found on behalf of both explanations.75

71

Brown, supra note 57, at 211.
Group polarization has been shown with simulated juries in the context of
guilt and innocence. See David Myers and Martin Kaplan, Group-Induced
Polarization in Simulated Juries, 2 Personality and Soc. Psych. Bulletin 63
(1976).
It is plausible to think that the requirement of unanimity pushed
people further in the direction of the dominant view, an idea that might be
fortified with the thought that those with outlier positions (in favor of
extreme awards) would be especially likely to hold out against a compromise
view, thus producing pressure toward the extremes. We are unaware, however,
of any studies of choice shifts that show a difference between the outcomes
produced by a unanimity rule and the outcomes produced by majority rule. Note
also that numerous studies show that group polarization occurs regardless of
the decision rule and hence it is extremely unlikely that the unanimity rule
accounted for other results here:
The shift effect is about equally robust
regardless of whether a group decision is required. See Myers and Lamm,
supra note 3, 611 (1976). Of course we cannot exclude the possibility that
the results would be somewhat different without a unanimity rule; this is in
fact a good area for subsequent empirical study, especially in light of
continuing questions about the consequences of requirements of jury
unanimity.
73
See Brown, supra note 57, at XXX.
74
Isenberg, supra note 3, and Brown, supra note 57, review this literature.
75
Note that conformity does not explain group polarization. See Myers, supra
note 63, at 562, indicating that people want to perceive themselves as
somewhat different from others and that people want to differentiate
themselves from others, to a small extent and in the right direction.
72
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The first involves social comparison.76 On this view, people
want to be perceived favorably by other group members (and also
to perceive themselves favorably), and once they hear what
others believe, they adjust their positions in the direction of
the dominant position. They may want to signal, for example,
that they are not cowardly or cautious, and hence they will
frame their position so that they do not appear such by
comparison to other group members.77 The dynamic behind the
social comparison explanation is that most people may want to
take a position of a certain socially preferred sort, and no one
can know what such a position would be until the positions of
others are revealed.78 Thus individuals move their judgments in
order to preserve their image to others and their image to
themselves. This effect helps explain a shift toward caution
(the cautious shift ) as well as toward risk-taking.79
The second explanation emphasizes the role of persuasive
arguments.80 The key point here is that an individual s choice or
position on an issue is a function of the number and
persuasiveness of arguments presented. Because a group that is
inclined in a certain direction will have a disproportionate
number of arguments supporting that direction, the result of
discussion will be to move individuals further in the direction
76

There is an obvious connection between this point and recent work in
economics on reputational influences on behavior. See Timur Kuran, Private
Truths, Public Lies (1996).
77
On signaling generally, see Eric Posner, Symbols, Signals, and the Law
(forthcoming 2000).
78
Once the real location of the mean was known, should it not be the case,
granting that everyone wanted to see himself as reasonably audacious, that
those who were really below the mean would be motivated to adopt riskier
positions and so change the mean and produce the risky shift? Brown, supra
note 57, at 214.
79
Investigations of social influence have emphasized both one-upmanship and
the removal of pluralistic ignorance, that is, ignorance of what other people
think (or are willing to say they think). Note that it is implicit in these
findings that people seem to want not to conform, but to be different from
others in a desirable way. To be virtuous˚.˚.˚. is to be different from the
mean--in the right direction and to the right degree. Brown, supra note 57,
at 469.
80
There is an obvious connection between this theory and recent work in
economics on informational influences on behavior and in particular on
information cascades. See David Hirchleifer, The Blind Leading The Blind, in
The New Economics of Human Behavior (1997).
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of their initial inclinations. Thus it is suggested that the
important thing that happens in discussion is that individual
arguments are expressed and become fully shared. 81 Once the set
of individual arguments is exposed to all individual members,
there will be a movement toward a more extreme point in the
direction of initial inclinations, simply because arguments in
that direction have been pressed and repeated, and opposing
arguments will be infrequent.82
These two mechanisms help account for severity shifts as
well; they help explain the bases for rhetorical asymmetry. As
our University of Chicago study suggests, arguments for higher
awards seem more persuasive, other things being equal, than
arguments for lower awards. This is exactly what is meant by
rhetorical asymmetry, in the sense that certain arguments (for
"sending a stronger signal") seem more convincing than others
(for "ensuring against overdeterrence"). In addition, social
influences, given existing norms, are likely to push people
toward higher awards, simply because a concern for reputation,
and for self-conception, generally argue in favor of supporting
higher awards in the face of conflict. People who argue for
higher awards seem to want to give appropriate punishment to
wrongdoing (a good thing to seem to want), whereas those who
argue for lower awards seem, other things being equal, to be
lenient toward wrongdoing by corporations or solicitous to them
(not a good thing to seem to be). We emphasize that these are
simply descriptive points, and social norms could be otherwise,
as they apparently are in the context of criminal conviction,
where leniency shifts have been observed.83
V. Implications and Reforms
To know whether the dollar verdicts of deliberating juries
are better than the dollar awards of statistical juries, it
seems necessary to have a theory of appropriate punitive damage
awards, and it is not our purpose here to set out such a theory.
In its absence, the simplest conclusion from our study is that
to the extent that there is a concern about unpredictable damage
81
82
83

Brown, supra note 57, at 219.
Brown, supra note 57, at 219.
See note supra.
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awards, deliberation is not likely to alleviate that concern,
and indeed is likely to aggravate it, as demonstrated by our
discussion in part III.84
Of course this unpredictability would probably be lower
with larger juries (say of size twelve). But while this
increase would almost certainly reduce the problem somewhat-because predictability generally increases with group size85 -there is little reason to hope that it would make a qualitative
difference. In our current study, deliberating juries of six
performed no better than statistical juries of the same size
when judging punishment, but were worse when judging dollars.
The statistical juries in our previous study (which were the
primary basis for our conclusions about unpredictable awards)
contained twelve jurors. Thus, if the relationship between
deliberating and statistical juries we found here holds, the
likely outcome is that deliberating juries of twelve would show
less predictability for dollar awards than our statistical
juries of twelve; and those juries showed an extremely high
degree of unpredictability.
Unpredictability is a serious problem for jury verdicts,
partly because it ensures that the similarly situated will often
not be treated similarly (and thus produces unfairness for
plaintiffs and defendants alike), partly because it may produce
overdeterrence in risk-averse defendants (if some of the awards
are sufficiently high), partly because of the sheer cost
involved in litigation-related expenses. Of course predictable
awards might be nothing to celebrate if they are too high or too
low. But unpredictability is by itself a cause for serious
concern. How do our findings here bear on possible reforms?
With respect to punitive damage awards, and damages awards
in related areas, many proposals have been motivated by a desire
to decrease unpredictability. This goal has, for example, played
a role in proposals for damage caps, for simple multipliers
84

Note also that because our study stipulated compensatory damages, and held
them fixed across cases, we may well have understated true variance in
punitive awards, because according to previous research, see Eisenberg et
al., supra note 10; Karpoff and Lott, supra note 27, real juries anchor on
their own compensatory award, rather than on some constant value
85
See e.g., Michael Saks, The Smaller the Jury, the Greater the
Unpredictability, 79 Judicature 263 (1996)
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(relating punitive awards to compensatory awards), and for
informing the jury of average awards or of intervals.86 It has
played a role in constitutional limitations as well.87 But many
of these proposals would do nothing about the problem of scaling
without a modulus; damage caps, for example, would reduce unduly
high awards, but would not inform the jury of the meaning of
various possible awards. In fact there is evidence that caps can
act as anchors, drawing jurors to them, and hence that caps
can actually increase unpredictability.88 For these reasons
damage caps are unlikely to resolve the fundamental problem.
An understanding of that problem motivated our earlier
discussion of the possibility of eliciting from the jury not
dollar awards, but normative judgments on a rating scale.89 These
judgments might be converted into a dollar award through some
kind of calibration function, based on experts ( technocratic
populism ) or on population-wide data relating normative
judgments to dollar awards ( predictable populism ).90 Before our
study here, it would be possible to question whether it is
practical to ask a deliberating jury to make a moral judgment on
a rating scale, hardly an ordinary practice in daily life, and
indeed a task that might seem even odder than the somewhat more
familiar one of punishing wrongdoers through dollar awards.
The findings here do not lead directly to any particular
reform proposal; but they add several points to the existing
literature. First, they demonstrate that juries can use a
punishment rating scale quite reliably. Juries are able to
answer the normative question directly, and they are also able
to use a rating scale far more reliably than the familiar dollar
scale. And if deliberating juries are thought to have advantages
over other, less populist institutions---as many people clearly
believe91---then there is reason to consider a reform proposal
86
See Saks et al., supra note 39 (discussing alternative approaches and their
effects).
87
See BMW v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1601 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring).
88
Linda Babcock, J. Legal Stud. (?);Jennifer Robbennolt (?); there is
definitely a piece on this, cited in our Yale piece, I think in the
discussion of damage caps
89
See Sunstein, Kahneman, and Schkade, supra note 4, at 2112-2121.
90
See id.
91
See Galanter and Luban, supra note 18.
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that would involve directly eliciting the jury s moral judgment.
As noted, these judgments might be converted into a dollar award
by some kind of calibration formula, defined by expert judgments
about what different dollar awards would mean or do to
particular defendants, or instead on population-wide data
relating normative judgments to dollar awards. Either route
could greatly diminish unpredictability.92
The data here, along with previous data, show that a
calibration formula is also feasible to develop and use.93 In
such a reform, juries might be asked to perform two simple
tasks: decide whether punitive damages should be awarded at
all; and produce a punishment rating on a scale that has
verbal descriptions to accompany the numbers. It is easy to
imagine a possible jury instruction that would accompany these
tasks. We have shown that this approach is entirely feasible,
and also that it would increase predictability.
An additional point stems from the finding that
deliberating juries do not reduce but actually increase erratic
awards. We have seen as well that deliberation can produce
juries in which group discussion yields awards much higher than
those of even the highest of pre-discussion judgments. Without
saying whether the resulting judgments are good or bad, our
findings fortify the suggestion that difficulties with the
dollar scale make it hazardous to continue to rely on the
current system, in which juries must map their moral judgments
onto that scale without being given any guidance about the
meaning of the various points on the scale.94
The most radical reform would be to dispense with the jury
entirely and to move toward judicial judgments or even to
develop a kind of penalty schedule, based on the judgments of
some combination of representative and expert institutions.95 We
92

See Sunstein, Kahneman, and Schkade, supra note 4, at 2113-2120.
Id. at 2112-2118.
94
To be sure, eliciting moral judgments rather than dollar awards would not
answer all of the relevant questions, because choice shifts produce not only
higher and lower dollar awards, but also higher and lower moral judgments.
95
The idea has received considerable attention in the analogous area of
contingent valuation. See Murray Rutherford et al., Assessing Environmental
Losses: Judgments of Importance and Damage Schedules, 22 Harv. Envtl. L.
Rev. 51 (1998); Richard B. Stewart, Liability for Natural Resource Injury, in
Analyzing Superfund 219, 241-44 (Richard L. Revesz and Richard B. Stewart
93
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cannot evaluate these alternatives here. Of course the radical
reform might be rejected if the relevant institutions would be
unreliable, perhaps because bureaucracies might be vulnerable to
the exercise of politically powerful private groups. The
question is one of comparative institutional competence. What we
have added here is that the process of deliberation will
increase awards generally and high awards dramatically, a result
that cannot be comforting in light of the resulting
unpredictability.
VI. Brief General Notes on Deliberation
The topic of deliberation has attracted a great deal of
recent interest in both political and legal theory.96 Much of
the relevant work depends on claims about the consequences of
deliberation. But for the most part, the discussion in law and
political theory has not been empirically informed.97 Our study
here provides a remarkable set of data about the effects of
deliberation with respect to both "pure" moral judgments (as
measured by punishment ratings) and dollar awards.98 An obvious
question is whether an analysis of the data suggests that
deliberation has moved people in better or worse directions. We
offer some brief notations here.
It might seem tempting to say that with respect to both
punitive intent and damage awards, there is no basis for
choosing between the results of jury deliberation and the
eds. 1995). In the area of compensatory damages, see the plea for damages
schedules in Bovbjerg et al., supra note 24. In the punitive damage context,
see Viscusi, supra note 17; Sunstein, Kahneman, and Schkade, supra note 4, at
2121-2126. For damages generally, see Atiyah, supra note 26.
96
See, e.g., Deliberative Democracy (Jon Elster ed. 1998); Amy Gutmann and
Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (1997).
97
Exceptions include Stokes, supra note , and James Fishkin s set of studies
of the deliberative opinion poll. See James Fiskin, The Voice of the People
(1998).
98
Note, however, that our study did not and could not guarantee what many
theorists of deliberative democracy take to be a precondition of wellfunctioning deliberation: an absence of strategic behavior, a willingness to
listen, a norm of reciprocity, equality among members. Undoubtedly some of
those in order groups behaved strategically and some were not willing to
listen; some were undoubtedly more equal than others. Ours is a test of realworld deliberation, not ideal deliberation. An examination of the tapes gives
an overall impression, however, that the participants generally listened well
and obeyed a principle of equality.
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results that would be produced by taking the median of
nondeliberating six-person groups. Consider just one case, in
which the median individual predeliberation punishment rating
was 5.5 and the median dollar award $250,000; after
deliberation, the jury rating was 7.0 and the dollar award $3
million. Which is better? Without a substantive theory about
appropriate punishment ratings or dollar awards, it might seem
impossible to say.99
If social influence and persuasive arguments are at work,
there is a tendency to move to a more extreme point direction of
the group’s initial inclination; but do these mechanisms produce
improvements? It seems hard to know without evaluating the
initial positions that produce social influence, and without
knowing whether the arguments found to be persuasive are
actually right. The finding of severity shifts, apparently
rooted in rhetorical asymmetry, also raises troubling questions.
The argument that "a stronger signal needs to be given to other
wrongdoers," or that "we need to get the attention of this
defendant," is far more powerful than the argument, "wait, there
is a threat of overdeterrence," or, "a punitive damage award
will give the plaintiff a windfall." Here too it is not clear
whether the severity shifts lead to better judgments.
It is always possible that the rhetorical asymmetry is
counteracting some other kind of asymmetry, or a bias in the
system. If, for example, jurors have a systematic bias against
personal injury actions, a pro-plaintiff rhetorical asymmetry,
with respect to dollar awards, might supply a corrective. What
is disturbing about the rhetorical asymmetry that we have
described is not necessarily that it produces worse awards, but
its mechanical, case-independent quality. If the result of the
rhetorical asymmetry is to produce better awards, it would not
be a shock - stranger things have happened - but it would be a
lucky coincidence.
To be sure, there may be some procedural reasons to have
some confidence in the outcomes of a deliberative process. By
hypothesis, more time is spent on the problem, and more time
might well help, at least in general; judgments reached after
deliberation will be more informed, simply because more
arguments will be introduced; deliberation tends to increase
99

A more extended treatment of the normative issues raised by choice shifts
and group polarization can be found in Sunstein, supra note.

43

Deliberating about Dollars

consensus; and deliberation will, other things being equal,
produce movement in the direction favored by more confident
group members, and more confident people are likely (though
hardly certain) to have some reason for their confidence. On
procedural grounds, these points give some reason to think that
with respect to punishment ratings, the outcomes of deliberation
are likely to be better than the outcomes that would be produced
by identifying the median or mean judgment of individuals. But
because of the arbitrariness introduced by the selection of a
modulus, we have no such confidence for dollar verdicts. There
is little reason to believe that the dollar awards of actual
juries are better than the dollar awards of statistical juries.
If all existing punitive damage awards were doubled, or subject
to a sliding scale of increase, so that small awards would go up
a little, and large awards would go up a lot, would the system
of civil penalties be better? We cannot insist on a negative
answer; but it is far from obvious how one would defend an
affirmative answer.
VII. Conclusion
We have found that as compared with the median of individual
judgments, deliberation makes low punishment judgments decrease
and high punishment judgments increase. It also makes--and this
is our most important finding--dollar awards generally increase,
while making high dollar awards substantially increase, in a
general severity shift. We have also found, somewhat to our
surprise, that deliberating juries produce more unpredictability
than would be found by taking the median of predeliberation
judgments from jurors.
These findings have implications for damage awards in general
and also for understanding social deliberation. From the
normative point of view, it is hard to know whether the
resulting judgments are better than the median of predeliberative individual judgments. But five points seem clear.
First, moral judgments about personal injury cases are very
widely shared over diverse communities and demographic
categories. Second, those shared moral judgments do not produce
predictable dollar awards. Third, choice shifts occur in the
context of punishment ratings; hence group judgments go to more
extreme points in the direction of the inclination originally
indicated by the median of predeliberation judgments. Fourth,
dollar awards reflect a systematic severity shift, apparently a
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result of a rhetorical asymmetry in which arguments for higher
awards have a general advantage over arguments for lower awards.
Fifth, the problem of unpredictable and erratic dollar verdicts
is increased, not alleviated, by the fact that juries are
deliberative bodies.
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Appendix
Glover v. General Assistance
Joan Glover, a five-year-old child, ingested a large number
of a non-prescription allergy medicine called Allerfree, and
required a three-week hospital stay. The Allerfree bottle used a
faulty childproof safety cap. The Glovers sued the manufacturer
of Allerfree, the General Assistance company. The trial jury
ordered General Assistance to pay the Glovers $200,000 in
compensatory damages.
Facts of the Case Established at Trial
Joan s parents testified that after her birth they had
childproofed their house and ensured that all of their
medications had childproof safety caps. The Allerfree bottle
carries a label reading Childproof Cap. Joan found the pills
in a kitchen drawer and ingested most of the bottle. The
overdose permanently weakened her respiratory system, which will
make her more susceptible to breathing-related diseases such as
asthma and emphysema for the rest of her life.
General Assistance is a large company (with profits of $100200 million per year) that manufactures a variety of nonprescription medicines. The company has sold tens of thousands
of bottles of medicines with childproof safety caps that were
generally effective, but had a failure rate much higher than any
others in the industry. Internal company documents showed that
General Assistance had chosen to ignore federal regulations
requiring more effective safety caps. An internal memo presented
at trial says that this stupid, unnecessary federal regulation
is a waste of our money ; it acknowledges the risk that
Allerfree might be punished for violating the regulation but
says the punishments are extremely mild; basically we d be
asked to improve the safety caps in the future. An official at
the Food and Drug Administration had previously warned a General
Assistance executive that the company was on shaky ground on
this one.
Closing Argument by Glovers Attorney
The attorney for the Glovers argued that General Assistance s
disregard for children s safety and for the law was abhorrent
and represented exactly the kind of reckless corporate greed
deserving of a high award of punitive damages. He concluded that
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General Assistance s shocking profit-mongering should be
punished so that the company would not feel itself at liberty to
put children at risk in the future.
Closing Argument by General Assistance s Attorney
The attorney for General Assistance emphasized that while the
cap had a high failure rate relative to others on the market, it
had nonetheless been conceded at trial that the cap was
effective in most cases. She argued that, given that the FDA
official had only communicated to them verbally, and had not
required the company to take any action, it was not at all clear
that the cap was actually in violation of the regulation at all.
A Jury s Decision
Imagine that a jury in a civil trial is deliberating about a
personal injury case in which the defendant is a large
corporation (with annual profits of approximately $200 million).
The jury has already (a) unanimously ordered the defendant to
pay an amount of compensatory damages that fully compensates the
plaintiff, and (b) unanimously concluded that while the
underlying conduct was not truly horrendous, it was sufficiently
reckless to justify an award of punitive damages as well (in
addition to compensatory damages).
The jurors then decided to think individually about the
proper amount of punitive damages, prior to deliberating as a
group.
They have now made their individual determinations, and
group deliberation has begun.
Please do not turn to the next page until requested to do
so.
Deliberating Over An Amount of Punitive Damages
Juror A states an amount of punitive damages. Juror B
states an amount that is much higher, three times A s amount.
(You are not expected to know the exact amounts stated by A and
B.)
What arguments would you expect to hear from Juror B, to
support an award that is higher than Juror A’s proposal?
On the lines below, please write down a list of the
arguments that you might expect to hear from Juror B in support
of a higher award. Write as many distinct arguments as you can,
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briefly summarizing each idea in a short phrase or sentence.
Please write only one distinct idea per line.
Which Is Harder to Defend?
In general, which position would you expect to be harder
for a juror to argue for in a deliberation? (please circle the
letter of your answer)
a) it is harder to argue that damages should be higher
b) it is harder to argue that damages should be lower
c) the positions are equally hard to argue for
Very briefly, please write down the reason for your answer in
the space below.
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Cass R. Sunstein
Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service
Professor of Jurisprudence
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